Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E.
Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of
Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” The study that emerged was an
internal report titled “Operations of Sedgwick’s Division.” In it, Stinson
examined “certain aspects of the operations in the hope that their
clarification will result in a more correct interpretation of the battle
story.” These “aspects” are casualties, density of formation, accusation of
rashness, the “ambush” question, and the Confederate order of battle. His sixty-page
typescript report challenged the standing narrative of the fight for the West
Woods established by Winthrop Palfrey’s The
Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1881) and
Francis A. Walker’s History of the Second
Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1886). While cited in some secondary sources, Stinson’s report has never been
published and is located in the Antietam National Battlefield Archives. Over the next few months, selected sections of his report will be
posted here. I have chosen to begin with Part
III—Analysis and not post Parts I and II which Stinson calls Preliminary
Data and Operations—both of which
are treated in greater detail in the report's subsequent sections.
========================
"Part III-Analysis
Although this study deals exclusively with the operations of
Sedgwick’s Division, any analysis must consider these operations in relation to
the commitment of the entire II Corps. This is necessary for two reasons: the
II Corps was committed as a unit by the commanding general and the corps
commander, General Sumner, was physically present at the head of Sedgwick’s
Division and therefore responsible for all tactical decisions concerning that
unit.
A. The Battle Plan
In McClellan’s own words, his plan for the Battle of
Antietam was to attack the enemy’s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield,
supported by Sumner’s and, if necessary by Franklin’s, and, as soon as matters
looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy’s
extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and,
having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and,
whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our
center with all the forces then disposable. [1]
It must be assumed that when Sumner received the order to
advance at 7:20 both he and McClellan envisioned that the II Corps would be
operating within the framework of the above stated plan. As far as General
Headquarters knew, at the time Sumner was dispatched, the attack of the Federal
right wing was progressing favorably.
During the hour and fifteen minutes it took the advance of
the II Corps to reach the front, significant changes in the situation were
taking place. Perhaps most important of all was the fact, which Sumner had no
way of knowing, that Burnside’s attack was not developing as per plan, in fact
would be so dilatory that the enemy would be able to shift a whole division
from the IX Corps front to the northern sector and send the two reserve
divisions as well. This point is usually overlooked by Sumner’s critics but the
objective historian should bear in mind that Sumner acted within the guidelines
set forth in McClellan’s plan and had every reason to believe that his fellow
corps commanders would do so also.
To accomplish this mission, Sumner’s column contained two
infantry divisions (Sedgwick and French) comprising some 12,000 men. A third
division (Richardson) was delayed for a time by General Headquarters but should
be considered as a part of the available force. In addition, Sumner knew that
the VI Corps was en route to the battlefield and would be available for further
support if needed. It was certainly not improvident to believe that an attack
force of 12,000 men supported by 5,000 more had a better than average chance of
breaking through the already battered Confederate left and driving it toward
Sharpsburg. With this in mind, as he approached the zone of combat Sumner
ordered French to follow on Sedgwick’s left.
As has been shown, this promising plan was not followed and
Sumner attacked with only a third of his force. The reasons for the deviation
are discussed in Section B."
Next: Section B--Sumner's Dispersal of Force
=======================
[1] Stinson cites “McClellan, O[fficial] R[ecord], 55.”
McClellan in his “Second Preliminary Report” dated October 15, 1862 recounted
that “The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left--at least to
create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more
by assailing the enemy's right--and, as soon as one or both of the flank
movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I
might then have on hand.” OR—Series I—Vol. XIX/1.
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