The 1962 Stinson Study: Sixth Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” What follows is the sixth entry from his report: Appendix C-Accusation of Rashness.

"Appendix C--Accusation of Rashness

It is hoped that the complexities of the situation facing Sumner prior to his ordering Sedgwick forward have been discussed thoroughly in the Analysis Section of this report. Because of them, many writers of the battle have sought a simple explanation requiring little space but still satisfying the reader as to why a corps commander would voluntarily expose one of his divisions to annihilation and allow the other two to stray off without his guidance. This has led to two theories, which, because of their widespread belief, should be commented on.

Francis A. Walker
Duke University

The most common of these, seemingly coined by Palfrey and Walker, is that Sumner had spent 'all his life in the cavalry' and 'had the instincts of a cavalry commander.' [1] The implication of irresponsible charges at the head of madcap horsemen is clear and conveys the thought that Sumner plunged into the West Woods with the same amount of consideration he would have given to an attack against a band of hostile braves. The fact is, that while most of Sumner's 43 years service had been in the cavalry he was a trained officer and quite aware of the capabilities and employment of infantry. At least his first four years in the army had been spent as a lieutenant in the 2nd Infantry. [2] More significant is that his recent experiences as commander of an infantry corps on the Peninsula surely had made him aware that his capacity was no longer that of commanding a few companies on the Indian frontier.

The "headstrong" concept is carried along in the second theory and frequently the two are combined. This centers around the fact that Sumner had been ordered to hold the II Corps in readiness to march one hour before daybreak yet had not received the order to advance until 7:20. It is often said that Sumner became so agitated at the delay that when he finally was released, he rushed headlong into the action. But even in granting that he was not happy with a passive role, it is going beyond sound historical judgment to assign his hasty advance solely to this reason. It is unreasonable to suppose that an officer of Sumner's experience would discard common sense merely to get into action.

Two other theories should be given more credence and are, when the situation and Sumner's orders are considered, certainly more plausible. Ropes has stated one of these as follows:

'There can be little doubt that representations made to General Sumner of the urgent need of reinforcements on this part of the field of battle influenced him greatly, and account in great part for the impetuosity of his attack. ' [3]

This is closely allied with the fourth theory, advanced by Sumner's son, to the effect that the XII Corps has just about spent its offensive potential and to keep up the momentum of the attack Sumner had to throw in Sedgwick immediately. [4]

In summation, careful study of every known ramification of the problem leads the writer to the conclusion that the last two theories are correct. If the XII Corps successes were to be exploited they would have to be done so immediately, and by the II Corps, which, after all, had been committed for that very purpose in the first place. As we have stated in the analysis, Sumner's error was not in ordering an immediate advance but in accompanying it personally to the exclusion of this other units which would be needed to protect Sedgwick and drive the attack home."

Next--The "Ambush" Question

Source: Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. Operations of Sedgwick's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1962. This typescript report is at the Antietam National Battlefield Library and Archives. All notes to Stinson's report are enclosed in quotes; bibliographic citations are from Stinson.

Notes:

1. "Walker, 103." Francis A. Walker, History of the Second Corps in the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886).

2. "Heitman I, 936." Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army. 2 Volumes (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903).

3. "Ropes, 365-366." John C. Ropes, The Story of the Civil War: The Campaigns of 1862 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1898). 

4. "14 HMSM, 10 (S.S. Sumner)." Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. Volume XIV. Paper read by S[amuel] S. Sumner before the Society on 2 January, 1917.

The 1962 Stinson Study: Fifth Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” What follows is the fifth entry from his report: Appendix B-Density of Formation.

"Appendix B--Density of Formation

A great deal of the criticism directed at General Sumner's conduct at Antietam stems from the fact that he deployed Sedgwick's Division in a formation too dense to allow for proper maneuverability in the event of a flank attack.

Col. Joshua T. Owen,
69th Pennsylvania
Library of Congress

[Here Stinson refers to a diagram to "illustrate the validity of such a charge." At this time the diagram and others mentioned in the report have not been located. When they are, I will add them to this site.]

The diagram above shows the formation designated by Sumner. Note that the interval is too close to allow the second and third lines to change front to the left if the forward progress of the first line is checked. This is exactly what occurred. In the diagram below it is seen that with an interval of 250 yards such a change of front to either flank could have been executed.

Even if there were no danger of a flank attack, Sumner's formation was still too dense for an approach under fire. Colonel Owen of the third line sums up this point in his report:

'I beg leave to state...as a matter worthy of discussion in a military point of view, whether the disaster was not attributable to its [the Philadelphia Brigade] having been placed in too great proximity to the other two lines, and thus, while intended to act as a reserve, subjected to as deadly a fire as those it was intended to support.' [1]

Palfrey, who was with the second line, commented:

 'The lines were so near together that the projectile that went over the heads of the first line was likely to find its billet in the second or third.' [2]

It may be concluded that the dense formation ordered by Sumner was one of the major contributing factors to the confusion, high loss, and severe defeat of Sedgwick's Division."
Next: Appendix C--Accusation of Rashness.

Source: Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. Operations of Sedgwick's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1962. This typescript report is at the Antietam National Battlefield Library and Archives. All notes to Stinson's report are enclosed in quotes.
Notes:

[1] "OR 319 (Owen)." This is Col. Joshua T. Owen, commander of the 69th Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Brigade (O.O. Howard), Sedgwick's Division, II Corps. Stinson notes in his bibliography that "All references [to the Official Records] are from Volume XIX, Part I unless otherwise cited. "[References] will be cited O.R. followed by the page number and the name of the person who submitted the report, as follows: O.R., 275 [Sumner]."

[2] "Palfrey 84." Francis Winthrop Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1882)."

Lt. Robert J. Park, Jr., 72nd Pennsylvania, Company R

From the Philadelphia Inquirer, October 18, 1862.

"Died. Park--On Saturday evening, of wounds received at the battle of Antietam, Lieutenant Robert J. Park, Jr., in the 21st year of his age, of Company R, Baxter's Fire Zouaves, Seventy-second Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers.

Central High School, Philadelphia, 1852

His friends and those of the family, the officers and members of his regiment now in the city, the National Guards, the Faculty and Alumni of the Central High School, are respectfully invited to attend his funeral, from his fathers residence, No. 201 Thirteenth Street, this (Saturday) afternoon, at 2 1/2 o'clock. Interment at Monument Cemetery."

In 1860, Robert J. Park, Jr. (18) resided in Philadelphia's 8th Ward with his father (50) and mother, Mary G. Park (44). His siblings were William D. (20), Annie C. (15), and Orlando B. (12). Also in residence was Kate S. Redgrave (25) and William D. Park (57), and Eliza Cheatam (19) an African American "domestic." The senior Park and William D. Park (who may have been an uncle) listed their occupations as printers. U.S. Census, Pennsylvania, 1860.

Philadelphia's Monument Cemetery was razed in 1956 by Temple University to make room for a parking lot. Of the 28,000 buried there, approximately 8,000 were removed to other cemeteries; the remaining 20,000 were buried in a mass grave in the city's Lawnview Cemetery. The Monument site was later developed from a parking lot to an astroturf field where Temple University’s lacrosse and field hockey teams play. For more on the Monument Cemetery story, see Ed Snyder's blog post on "How Monument Cemetery Was Destroyed." and Katrina Ohstrom' post on Hidden City Philadelphia blog. While Robert J. Park, Jr. may be lost, the regiment's commander, Col. DeWitt Clinton Baxter, can be found in Lawnview's Broad Lawn section, Range 14, Grave 84.

Image of Central High School is from The Stranger's Guide in Philadelphia and Its Environs (Philadelphia, Lindsay & Blakiston, 1852).

The 1962 Stinson Study: Fourth Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” What follows is the fourth entry from his report: Appendix A-Casualties.

"Appendix A--Casualties[1]

(K-Killed; W-Wounded; M-Missing; Tot-Total)

Totals of Sedgwick's Infantry, Woodruff's Battery, and 125th Pennsylvania:
	K- 397	W- 1,1693	M- 246	Tot- 2,336
Second Division, II Corps (Sedgwick)
	K- 373	W- 1,593	M- 244	Tot- 2,210
1st Brigade (Gorman)
34th NY	K-33	W-111	M-10	TOT-154
82ND NY	K-21	W-92	M-15	TOT-128
15TH MA	K-65	W-225	M-24	TOT-344
1ST MN	K-15	W-81	M-15	TOT-114
Brigade Total	K-134	W-539	M-67	TOT-740
2nd Brigade (Howard)
69TH PA	K-19	W-58	M-15	TOT-92
71ST PA	K-26	W-95	M-18	TOT-139
72ND PA	K-38	W-163	M-36	TOT-237
106TH PA	K-10	W-63	M-4	TOT-77
Brigade Total	K-93	W-379	M-73	TOT-545
3rd Brigade (Dana)
Staff	K-0	W-2	M-0	TOT-2
7TH MI	K-39	W-178	M-4	TOT-221
42ND NY	K-35	W-127	M-19	TOT-181
59TH NY	K-48	W-127	M-19	TOT-224
19TH  MA	K-8	W-108	M-30	TOT-146
20TH  MA	K-12	W-84	M-28	TOT-124
Brigade Total	K-142	W-652	M-104	TOT-898
Artillery
Woodruff (I, 1st U.S.)	K-0	W-6	M-0	TOT-6
Tompkins (A, 1st R.I.)[2]	K-4	W-15	M-0	TOT-19
Other
125TH PA	K-28	W-115	M-2	TOT-145
Average Regimental Losses (Compared with other divisions of II Corps)
Sedgwick and 125th  PA	K-28	W-120	M-18	TOT-166
Richardson and French	K-22	W-98	M-7	TOT-127

Percentage of Casualties
42 per cent (based on 5,200 infantry engaged)

The following tables, unless otherwise stated, are based solely on the number of reported casualties. Efforts to correlate the losses with those of other engagements or other units at Antietam have been avoided because of the impossibility in determining numbers engaged, without which the figures would be meaningless.

Divisional Casualties

Ranked No. 1 of 15 infantry divisions reporting loss at Antietam.

Brigade Casualties

Dana's Brigade ranked No. 1 of 40 brigades reporting
Gorman's Brigade ranked No. 2 of 40 brigades reporting
Howard's Brigade ranked No. 8 of 40 brigades reporting

Regimental Casualties

15th Massachusetts ranked No. 1 of 173 regiments reporting loss.
72nd Pennsylvania ranked No. 3 of 173 regiments reporting loss.
59th New York ranked No. 6 of 173 regiments reporting loss.
7th Michigan ranked No. 8 of 173 regiments reporting loss.
42nd New York ranked No. 18 of 173 regiments reporting loss.
34th New York ranked No. 23 of 173 regiments reporting loss.

While it is usually dangerous to compare casualty figures of different battles, the intensity of Sedgwick's loss was such that several examples are in order. The five divisions of the Federal army which were seriously engaged at South Mountain (Turner's and Fox's Gaps) had a combined loss of 1,813 of whom 325 were killed.[3] The total Federal loss at the Battle of Cedar Mountain was 2,381 with 314 killed.[4] At the Battle of Pea Ridge the total Federal loss was 1,384 with 203 killed.[5] When these figures are compared with Sedgwick's loss of 2,210 with 373 killed it is not hard to see how an experienced fighting man as Sumner could describe Antietam as a "very severe action--uncommonly severe."[6]"

Next, Appendix B: Density of Formation


Notes====

1. O.R. 189-200 (Casualty Report) [Stinson notes in his bibliography that "All references [to the Official Records] are from Volume XIX, Part I unless otherwise cited. "[References] will be cited O.R. followed by the page number and the name of the person who submitted the report, as follows: O.R., 275 [Sumner]."]
2. Thompkins' Battery was posted on the left of Greene's Division and was directly involved in the operations of that unit and French's Division.
3. O.R.,187 (Casualty Report)
4. B&L II, 496 [B&L is R.U. Johnson and C. C. Buell, eds.,Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1884-1888).]
5. B&L I, 337.
6. C.C.W. I, 369 (Sumner) Stinson's C.C.W. abbreviation is to his bibliographic source which is Thirty-eighth Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War 4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865.]

The 1962 Stinson Study: Third Entry

"Uncle" John Sedgwick, Library of Congress

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” What follows below is the third entry from his report: Part III: Conduct of Attack and Summation.

Conduct of Attack

Most of the points connected with the conduct of Sedgwick’s attack are obvious in reading the Operations section of this report.[1] The 75 yard interval between the brigade lines was far too close to permit the execution of a movement to cover a flank attack.[2] In addition, the designated order of battle rendered staff work above the regimental level almost impossible, particularly in a wooded area. This is to say that the brigade commanders could not coordinate their units properly because the line of battle was over a quarter of a mile long. This condition was exemplified by the 34th New York becoming separated from its brigade without its commander of Gorman realizing it. When Dana’s Brigade was hit he was forced to remain with the two left regiments thereby leaving the other three without a commander. Almost any formation would have been better than the one used by ideally it should have been with the brigades formed in column of regiments. While these criticisms are valid, it must also be remembered that the dispositions were made under the impression that French’s whole division would be covering the left.

The forward movement was conducted at double time, perhaps to minimize the effect of Confederate artillery fire[3]. But by moving on the double all the difficulties of keeping reign on the already unwieldy battle lines were magnified. Furthermore, a telescopic effect was produced when the first line was brought to an abrupt halt on the farther edge of the woods. The rear lines kept moving forward until they had almost closed up on Gorman.

The total effect was that if the movement had been conducted in maneuvers rather than combat confusion would have resulted the moment the first line was ordered to halt. In other words, the formation was built-in confusion and it remained only for 7,000 Confederates to turn confusion into disaster.

Edwin Vose Sumner, Library of Congress

Summation

1. McClellan’s Responsibility. Although it is often done, McClellan should not be censored for the piecemeal attacks of Sedgwick and French. From the time he released the II Corps the conduct of the operation was in the hands of Sumner both in fact and theory. As Clausewitz has said, the army commander gives the direction of march to his corps commander and points out the enemy as the objective and victory as the goal. McClellan did this and from then on had to rely on Sumner to see that it was done. McClellan’s only tampering with the original order was to withhold Richardson’s Division temporarily and this had no bearing on the results or conduct of the operation.

2. Corps Command. There is little to praise in Sumner’s conduct as commander of the II Corps. Although he did so for what he considered good reason, Sumner separated himself from 2/3 of his corps and acted the part of a division commander. He did not coordinate his two lead divisions properly nor did he even know the whereabouts of one of them when Sedgwick began to give way. This is proved by the following message which was signaled to McClellan during the crisis: ‘Reinforcements are badly wanted. Our troops are giving way. I am hunting for French’s and Slocum’s Divisions. If you know where they are, send them immediately.[4]

Sumner felt that the situation warranted immediate attack. His most serious mistake was not in making the attack, but in not allowing Sedgwick to command it while he (Sumner) remained in the rear to coordinate the corps.

3. Artillery Support. The wooded nature of the terrain and the comparative shortness of the conflict combined to render the artillery to an insignificant role in Sedgwick’s operations. No batteries moved west of the Hagerstown Pike with the divisional advance, in fact Woodruff’s Battery of the division did not come into position south of the Cornfield until the infantry was already falling back.[5] Many Federal batteries contributed to the breakup of the Confederate attempt to pursue Sedgwick but their activities will be the subject of a later study.[6]

4. Result. The II Corps was committed to attack and, if possible, break the confederate left. Two-thirds of it did not even hit the Confederate left and the division that did, suffered a crushing defeat. On the basis of this, the result was a total failure. However, Sedgwick’s defeat was so complete that Sumner was convinced that further attacks in the sector would result in disaster. This undoubtedly saved at least one division of the VI Corps from launching an attack which could gain no decisive result.[7] The operation also resulted in obliging General Lee to commit all of his reserves and to strip his extreme right of a division.[8] This weakened other portions of the Confederate line and eased the task of the IX Corps considerably. 

Next, Appendices

Notes ====

Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. Operations of Sedgwick's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1962. This typescript report is at the Antietam National Battlefield Library and Archives. All notes to Stinson's report are enclosed in quotes.

1. The Operations Section of the Stinson Report will be uploaded in a future post.

2. Stinson directs the reader to Appendix B of his report. This will be uploaded in the next few days.

3. Stinson note: “Although descriptions of Sedgwick’s advance to the West Woods are often written to sound as if the division moved at parade cadence, there is ample evidence in the reports of the unit commanders that it was done at double time.”

4. “12 O.R., 134 (Signal Corps Report). There is no time on the message.” Stinson notes in his bibliography that "All references [to the Official Records] are from Volume XIX, Part I unless otherwise cited. "[References] will be cited O.R. followed by the page number and the name of the person who submitted the report, as follows: O.R., 275 [Sumner].”

5. “13 O.R., 309 (Woodruff). Hanson, 50, claims that Woodruff’s Battery was the only one to accompany Sedgwick into the West Woods but there is no evidence to support this.” Stinson’s “Hanson” reference is to Joseph Mills Hanson, A Report on the Employment of the Artillery at the Battle of Antietam, Maryland, With A view to Marking Battery Positions at the Antietam National Battlefield Site. Unpublished. National Park Service Report, 1940.

6. Stinson’s reference to a “later study” on artillery has not been found.

7. “14 B&L, II, 579 (Franklin). This is thoroughly discussed in Sunken Road Report, 34-39.” B&L is R.U. Johnson and C. C. Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1884-1888); the Sunken Road Report is identified in his bibliography as Dwight E. Stinson, The Attack on the Sunken Road: Operations of Richardson's and French's Divisions. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961.

8. This was John Walker’s Division.

The 1962 Stinson Study: Second Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” Part III: Analysis was posted earlier, what follows below is Part III: Sumner's Dispersal of Force.

==================
"Part III-Sumner's Dispersal of Force

Francis Winthrop Palfrey
Detail from Carte de Visite
Massachusetts Historical
Society.

As in most combat conditions, two situations existed in the zone toward which the II Corps was marching. One was the clear, uncluttered, and correct dispositions shown on the battle map and including such pertinent information as the enemy order of battle. The other was the situation as it appeared to the commander in the field, in this case General Sumner, complete with smoke, confusion, topographic obstructions, conflicting reports, and above all the knowledge that it was his responsibility to bring his men into action agains an enemy of unknown strength in an undetermined position.

Critics are prone to pass judgement on the basis of the former situation with little, if any, reference to the latter. It is safe to say that if Sumner had had the same amount of time to interpret it, he too would have made the correct decisions. The analyst must attempt to correlate the true situation with the facts known or available to Sumner before deciding if his attack was "madness"as Palfrey[1] has stated or if it was the most logical move under the circumstances.

Prior to 8:30 the Confederate main line of resistance on the northern sector of the battlefield was roughly West-Woods-East-Woods-Mumman House. Greene's breakthrough in the East Woods and advance to the Mumma Farm cleared the area north of the Dunker Church and east of the Pike, thereby shifting the Confederate line to one running generally north from the Church through the West Woods.[2]

Brig. Gen. George Sears Greene, XII Corps

South of the Church the line remained unchanged except that the Sunken Road position became an angle and the only part of the entire Confederate main line of resistance still fronting north. All of this took place less than half an hour before Sumner reached the East Woods. It had the effect of bringing his line of march across, rather than on, the axis of the earlier Federal attacks. The shift also created a gap between the divisions of the XII Corps (Williams and Greene) which would have a direct adverse bearing upon Sedgwick and the entire II Corps.

The sudden collapse of the Confederate line in the Cornfield area found Williams' Division in poor condition to follow-up. It had relieved the I Corps some time before and had suffered heavily in the sustained combat that preceded Greene's breakthrough.

The greater part of Crawford's Brigade was in the rear trying to regroup its depleted units.[3] Only three regiments of the entire division were even in proper position for pursuit [4] and their ranks were greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the three regiments were advancing into the Cornfield when sumner's advance was announced on the filed. The colonel of the 27th Indiana reported:

'They [the Confederates] broke and fled, in utter confusion, into a piece of woods on the right. We were then ordered to fix bayonets and advance, which was promptly done...We had advanced over the larger portion of [the Cornfield] when we were ordered to halt. I soon discovered that General Sumner's corps had arrived and were fresh...and the work of dislodging the enemy from the woods, designed for your shattered brigade, had been assigned to them.[5]'

Frank H. Schell's eyewitness rendering of Sumner,
Sedgwick and Staff advancing the division to
the West Woods.

Such was the situation Sumner found on his immediate front which goes a long way toward explaining what motivated his seemingly hasty advance. to express it very simply, the enemy main line was in headlong flight and the only pursuit force was a battered combat team of three regiments. It was the perfect moment for 5,000 fresh men to arrive and the most conservative of commanders would probably have done the same thing Sumner did and that is order the division forward.

But the key to the situation was the location and condition of Greene's Division. This small but organized body was, at the time Sedgwick entered the East Woods, regrouping on the Mumma Farm after its successful attack. It was also awaiting ammunition without which it could not continue its offensive operations.[6] Unfortunately Greene was the only general officer on the field who was aware of these facts. The wounding of Mansfield had left Williams in command of the XII Corps but at the time in question he was occupied in pulling the scattered units of his own division out of Sedgwick's line of advance. It is almost certain that he had no accurate information on Greene's whereabouts and condition.[7] To Sumner, Greene's Division appeared to be nothing more than 'some troops lying down on the left.'[8]

French, under orders to form on Sedgwick's inner flank, had an entirely different view of the situation. His line of march brought him in behind Greene and he could readily see that rather than a few scattered men, Greene commanded a fully organized division. Accordingly, he gave way to the left.[9] This was among the most critical decisions in the Battle of Antietam, for it severed Sedgwick from the rest of the corps and brought on two separate actions neither of which could support the other. Sedgwick attacked almost due west but because of the angle formed by the Sunken Road French, and later Richardson, struck almost due south. It left Sedgwick's flank completely uncovered, a fact unknown to the corps commander because he was with the lead division. This all occurred because Sumner and French interpreted Greene's presence in the opposite manner:

1. If French had seen Green as a small, disorganized body he would have passed over him and remained connected with Sedgwick's left.

2. If Sumner had seen Greene as a division with offensive potential he would have consulted with him probably before moving Sedgwick forward. This might have led to a coordinated movement of three divisions (Sedgwick, Greene, and French). At worst, it might have caused Sumner to wait long enough to ascertain French's position and insure that the two divisions would go in together.

Next post, "Conduct of Attack"

=========

Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. Operations of Sedgwick's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1962. This typescript report is at the Antietam National Battlefield Library and Archives.

Annotations below within quotation marks are from the Stinson report.

[1] "Francis Winthrop Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1882)."

[2] Here Stinson cites: "Sunken Road Report, 10. The changed position of the battle lines is also discussed in some detail by General Cox in B&L, II, 645 and may be seen by comparing Cope Maps #7 and 8." Stinson identifies these sources in his bibliography as: Sunken Road Report is Dwight E. Stinson, The Attack on the Sunken Road: Operations of Richardson's and French's Divisions. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961; B&L is R.U. Johnson and C.C. Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1884-1888); and Cope Maps are Antietam Battlefield Board, Maps of the Battlefield of Antietam. 14 sheets. Surveyed by Lieut. Col. E.B. Cope. Washington: United States War Department, 1904 and Revised 1908.

[3] O.R.., 487 (Knipe). Stinson notes in his bibliography that "All references [to the Official Records] are from Volume XIX, Part I unless otherwise cited. "[References] will be cited O.R. followed by the page number and the name of the person who submitted the report, as follows: O.R., 275 [Sumner]."

[4] "Cope Map #7. The regiments were the 27th Indiana, 2nd Massachusetts, and 3rd Wisconsin all of Gordon/Williams/XII. The three new Pennsylvania regiments of Crawford's Brigade were also on or near the line as was the 13th New Jersey but these units were operating almost on their won."

[5] "O.R., 499 (Colgrove)."

[6] Greene Report, 9. Stinson's Greene Report is to his bibliographic source : "Dwight E. Stinson, Analytical Study of the Operations of Greene's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961."

[7] "Greene Report, 19-21. Carman, 183, claims that Williams rode up to Sumner from the direction of the Mumma House but it is probable that he mean Miller rather than Mumma."

[8] "C.C.W., I, 368 (Sumner)." Stinson's C.C.W. abbreviation is to his bibliographic source which is Thirty-eighth Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865.

[9] "Sunken Road Report, 10."

The 1962 Stinson Study: First Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” The study that emerged was an internal report titled “Operations of Sedgwick’s Division.” In it, Stinson examined “certain aspects of the operations in the hope that their clarification will result in a more correct interpretation of the battle story.” These “aspects” are casualties, density of formation, accusation of rashness, the “ambush” question, and the Confederate order of battle. His sixty-page typescript report challenged the standing narrative of the fight for the West Woods established by Winthrop Palfrey’s The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1881) and Francis A. Walker’s History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886). While cited in some secondary sources, Stinson’s report has never been published and is located in the Antietam National Battlefield Archives. Over the next few months, selected sections of his report will be posted here. I have chosen to begin with Part III—Analysis and not post Parts I and II which Stinson calls Preliminary Data and Operations—both of which are treated in greater detail in the report's subsequent sections.

========================

"Part III-Analysis

Although this study deals exclusively with the operations of Sedgwick’s Division, any analysis must consider these operations in relation to the commitment of the entire II Corps. This is necessary for two reasons: the II Corps was committed as a unit by the commanding general and the corps commander, General Sumner, was physically present at the head of Sedgwick’s Division and therefore responsible for all tactical decisions concerning that unit.

A. The Battle Plan

In McClellan’s own words, his plan for the Battle of Antietam was to attack the enemy’s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner’s and, if necessary by Franklin’s, and, as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy’s extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and, whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable. [1]

It must be assumed that when Sumner received the order to advance at 7:20 both he and McClellan envisioned that the II Corps would be operating within the framework of the above stated plan. As far as General Headquarters knew, at the time Sumner was dispatched, the attack of the Federal right wing was progressing favorably.

During the hour and fifteen minutes it took the advance of the II Corps to reach the front, significant changes in the situation were taking place. Perhaps most important of all was the fact, which Sumner had no way of knowing, that Burnside’s attack was not developing as per plan, in fact would be so dilatory that the enemy would be able to shift a whole division from the IX Corps front to the northern sector and send the two reserve divisions as well. This point is usually overlooked by Sumner’s critics but the objective historian should bear in mind that Sumner acted within the guidelines set forth in McClellan’s plan and had every reason to believe that his fellow corps commanders would do so also.

To accomplish this mission, Sumner’s column contained two infantry divisions (Sedgwick and French) comprising some 12,000 men. A third division (Richardson) was delayed for a time by General Headquarters but should be considered as a part of the available force. In addition, Sumner knew that the VI Corps was en route to the battlefield and would be available for further support if needed. It was certainly not improvident to believe that an attack force of 12,000 men supported by 5,000 more had a better than average chance of breaking through the already battered Confederate left and driving it toward Sharpsburg. With this in mind, as he approached the zone of combat Sumner ordered French to follow on Sedgwick’s left.

As has been shown, this promising plan was not followed and Sumner attacked with only a third of his force. The reasons for the deviation are discussed in Section B."

Next: Section B--Sumner's Dispersal of Force

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[1] Stinson cites “McClellan, O[fficial] R[ecord], 55.” McClellan in his “Second Preliminary Report” dated October 15, 1862 recounted that “The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left--at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by assailing the enemy's right--and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand.” OR—Series I—Vol. XIX/1.