"They were making it rather warm for the troops on our right:" The 111th Pennsylvania and "Greene's Salient" at the Dunker Church--Part 1

Clermont, Pa, Feb. 4^th. 1892.^[1]

Maj. J. M. Gould,

     Portland, Me.

Comrade:

In reply to your letter of inquiry, in regard to our position at Antietam, would say, that I cannot give you much information as it has been thirty years since the battle was fought and as I never have visited the field since_ and as I was rather young_to know much about the organization of the army at that time, and as Popes army and McClellan had been consolidated only a few days before, I hardly know what Brigade or Div. I did belong to. So you must not think strange, if I fail to give you the required information.

The situation between 1000 and 1030 HRS as shown in the
Cope / Carman map. The 3rd Maryland, 111th Pennsylvania, 28th Pennsylvania,
and the 5th and 7th Ohio push into the Woods and the 30th Virginia,
46th and 48th North Carolina, along with Carlton's Battery give way.
Library of Congress.

As near as I can remember, on the night of the 16^th of Sept. We were camped in a large field near a piece of woods, directly in front of us facing the enemy, but another field between us and the woods, and a road to our right. ^[2]I remember the field that we lay in that night for there had been manure spread over it and not a very nice place to sleep on. But we were tired enough to sleep almost anywhere. Early in the morning of the 17^th, we were ordered to pack up before we had time to get any breakfast_ as the battle having already begun._ and moved to the next field, joining the one we were in and next to the woods_ and there we halted a few minutes, and were told that we would have time to get our breakfast, but had barely got a fire started_when we were ordered ahead[.] We then moved off to the left, perhaps a quarter of a mile_ towards a farm house and large barn^[3]_ just before we reached them we formed in line_ and moved to the front, with the 3^rd Md. on our left_ what regiment was on our right I don’t remember _ but think it was 28^th Pa. We moved up in line of battle towards a strip of woods^[4]_ as near as I can remember about thirty or forty rods wide_ with a strong rail fence at edge of woods and the Rebs_ in that strip of woods^[5], we moved up close to the fence and opened fire_ in meantime, we were under fire from the time we came out from behind this large piece of woods at our right and formed in line in front of this strip of woods. And the Captain of Co. B^[6] was killed before we fired a shot and I don’t know how many more, but I saw him fall. We fired a few rounds_ and were ordered to charge, and we climbed the fence, and drove the Rebs out of this strip of woods, and on the other

The situation between Noon and 12:15 as the 27th North Carolina and
Third Arkansas attack across the Hagerstown Turnpike. The 46th and 49th
North Carolina push through just to the north of the Dunker Church.
Library of Congress.

side was a large plowed field, and a cornfield ^[7]at our left. As we came out of the woods at the other side, there were no Rebs in sight, or at least only a few_ and they were getting out of sight as fast as they could. At our left, I think there were some in the cornfield yet, but did not stay there long. We stopped there a short time and then advanced across the plowed field, at the other side was a small ravine_ and beyond a rise of ground^[8], where a battery^[9] was brought up and stationed on this hill or knoll. We were behind this battery, at the foot of the hill. I don’t know what battery it was_but think it was six brass guns. The Rebs charged ^[10]us and tried to take the guns_ but failed, and moved off in an oblique direction to the left_ across the road^[11], and as our lines were at a right angle or nearly so, they were making it rather warm for the troops on our right we went to their assistance and joined in their line, and succeeded in driving them out of there, and we moved ahead across the road bringing our regt. near a school house or Church^[12]. I don’t know which, I always supposed it was the Sharpsburg school house, but it might have been a Church for aught I know. We held them there^[13] for an hour or so and about four o’clock_ we were reinforced by a new Reg. I think they must have been fully 800 men strong, and our Reg’t gave way to the left, and the Reg’t on our right_ gave way to the right, and let them in on our line, and before they had time to get formed in line and ready for business, the Rebs charged^[14] and poured a volley into them_ and they broke and run^[15] like the d__l. And that left a gap in our line_ that we had not time to close up_ and we had to retreat over nearly all the ground that we had fought over all day. I think if they had not come in at all, we could held our line, still there can be no blame attached to them, as it was the first time they were under fire_ and perhaps any other new regiment would done the same under the same circumstances, I don’t know what reg’t it was, but think it was a Penna regt and I heard some say that it was a New York Reg. but it does not matter. That ended our fighting for the day_ as the reserves^[16] were brought up and we were relieved. I cannot trace with any degree of accuracy on your map where we entered the fight, but think it was near where the dead of the 111^th Pa were buried, but I am not sure. Such, my old comrade, is as near a description of our movements at Antietam as I can give you from memory_ but I will see a member of our reg’t before long_ who lives but a few miles from here_ and will talk it over with him, and if we can give you any more information, will gladly do so. Should we both live that long_ I would be glad to meet you at Washington D.C. Next summer--at the National Encampment where we can talk it over and perhaps visit the battle field which I would very much like to do. Hoping to hear from you again, I remain yours in F. C. & L^[17].

J. Porter Howard

     Co. G, 111^th Pa. V.

     McKean Post 347 G.A.R.

     Smithport, Pa.

     P.O. (Clermont Pa.)

---

^[1] J. Porter Howard to John M. Gould, Februrary 4, 1892, Gould Papers, Dartmouth College. I’d like to express my thanks to Tom Clemens for forwarding a copy of the original letter to me. Tom is the editor of the Ezra Carman manuscript, The Maryland Campaign of 1862 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2010-17), in 3 Volumes. Notations by Gould in top margin: “Sent Fair pamphlet; Write me if you go to G.A.R., for a map; Write me if your comrade knows anything. (His map was returned without marks).”

John M. Gould (1839-1930) served as an adjutant with the 10th Maine at Antietam. Following the war, he wrote articles that appeared in the National Tribune recounting his experience on the battlefield. Like Ezra Carman he entered into extended correspondence with battle survivors. Brian Downey's Antietam on the Web under Gould.

^[2] Smoketown Road.

^[3] Probably the Middlekauf farmstead.

^[4] The East Woods.

^[5] This was probably Evander Law’s 2nd and 11th Mississippi and the 6th North Carolina. See Carman 07:20 map.

^[6] This was Capt. Arthur Corrigan.

^[7] This was probably the thin northwestern strip of the East Woods. A post and rail fence runs through it.

^[8] This is the knoll on which the Visitor’s Center now stands.

^[9] Carman’s 9 am map shows the 111th behind the First RI Light Battery D under command of Capt. J. Albert Monroe. He had 6 Napoleons (brass) in his battery.

^[10] This charge is depicted clearly in the Cope/Carman 900 hrs map. Kershaw’s 2nd, 7th, and 8th South Carolina made a dash for the guns. The 111th was directly behind Monroe’s battery’s left guns and took on the 2nd and 7th South Carolina.

^[11] Hagerstown Pike

^[12] The Dunker Church.

^[13] “there” is the salient south of the Dunker Church

^[14] There was a charge, at approximately Noon and recorded in Carman’s Noon map; but no such charge at 4 p.m. Howard seems to have his time wrong. The Noon Confederate advance consisted of the 46th North Carolina (Manning) and 49th North Carolina (Ransom) and elements of John Bell Hood’s Texas Division. This advanced pushed the 111th out of the Dunker Church Woods. The 111th spent the remainder of the day in the environs of the Samuel Poffenberger farmstead.

^[15] Howard may have been referring to the 13th New Jersey which consisted of 630 green troops under the command of Col. Ezra Carman. They were part of Williams’ Division (not Greene’s) and positioned themselves to the right of the 111th.

^[16] Sixth Corps.

^[17] Fraternity, comradeship, and loyalty.

The 1962 Stinson Study: Second Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” Part III: Analysis was posted earlier, what follows below is Part III: Sumner's Dispersal of Force.

==================
"Part III-Sumner's Dispersal of Force

Francis Winthrop Palfrey
Detail from Carte de Visite
Massachusetts Historical
Society.

As in most combat conditions, two situations existed in the zone toward which the II Corps was marching. One was the clear, uncluttered, and correct dispositions shown on the battle map and including such pertinent information as the enemy order of battle. The other was the situation as it appeared to the commander in the field, in this case General Sumner, complete with smoke, confusion, topographic obstructions, conflicting reports, and above all the knowledge that it was his responsibility to bring his men into action agains an enemy of unknown strength in an undetermined position.

Critics are prone to pass judgement on the basis of the former situation with little, if any, reference to the latter. It is safe to say that if Sumner had had the same amount of time to interpret it, he too would have made the correct decisions. The analyst must attempt to correlate the true situation with the facts known or available to Sumner before deciding if his attack was "madness"as Palfrey[1] has stated or if it was the most logical move under the circumstances.

Prior to 8:30 the Confederate main line of resistance on the northern sector of the battlefield was roughly West-Woods-East-Woods-Mumman House. Greene's breakthrough in the East Woods and advance to the Mumma Farm cleared the area north of the Dunker Church and east of the Pike, thereby shifting the Confederate line to one running generally north from the Church through the West Woods.[2]

Brig. Gen. George Sears Greene, XII Corps

South of the Church the line remained unchanged except that the Sunken Road position became an angle and the only part of the entire Confederate main line of resistance still fronting north. All of this took place less than half an hour before Sumner reached the East Woods. It had the effect of bringing his line of march across, rather than on, the axis of the earlier Federal attacks. The shift also created a gap between the divisions of the XII Corps (Williams and Greene) which would have a direct adverse bearing upon Sedgwick and the entire II Corps.

The sudden collapse of the Confederate line in the Cornfield area found Williams' Division in poor condition to follow-up. It had relieved the I Corps some time before and had suffered heavily in the sustained combat that preceded Greene's breakthrough.

The greater part of Crawford's Brigade was in the rear trying to regroup its depleted units.[3] Only three regiments of the entire division were even in proper position for pursuit [4] and their ranks were greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the three regiments were advancing into the Cornfield when sumner's advance was announced on the filed. The colonel of the 27th Indiana reported:

'They [the Confederates] broke and fled, in utter confusion, into a piece of woods on the right. We were then ordered to fix bayonets and advance, which was promptly done...We had advanced over the larger portion of [the Cornfield] when we were ordered to halt. I soon discovered that General Sumner's corps had arrived and were fresh...and the work of dislodging the enemy from the woods, designed for your shattered brigade, had been assigned to them.[5]'

Frank H. Schell's eyewitness rendering of Sumner,
Sedgwick and Staff advancing the division to
the West Woods.

Such was the situation Sumner found on his immediate front which goes a long way toward explaining what motivated his seemingly hasty advance. to express it very simply, the enemy main line was in headlong flight and the only pursuit force was a battered combat team of three regiments. It was the perfect moment for 5,000 fresh men to arrive and the most conservative of commanders would probably have done the same thing Sumner did and that is order the division forward.

But the key to the situation was the location and condition of Greene's Division. This small but organized body was, at the time Sedgwick entered the East Woods, regrouping on the Mumma Farm after its successful attack. It was also awaiting ammunition without which it could not continue its offensive operations.[6] Unfortunately Greene was the only general officer on the field who was aware of these facts. The wounding of Mansfield had left Williams in command of the XII Corps but at the time in question he was occupied in pulling the scattered units of his own division out of Sedgwick's line of advance. It is almost certain that he had no accurate information on Greene's whereabouts and condition.[7] To Sumner, Greene's Division appeared to be nothing more than 'some troops lying down on the left.'[8]

French, under orders to form on Sedgwick's inner flank, had an entirely different view of the situation. His line of march brought him in behind Greene and he could readily see that rather than a few scattered men, Greene commanded a fully organized division. Accordingly, he gave way to the left.[9] This was among the most critical decisions in the Battle of Antietam, for it severed Sedgwick from the rest of the corps and brought on two separate actions neither of which could support the other. Sedgwick attacked almost due west but because of the angle formed by the Sunken Road French, and later Richardson, struck almost due south. It left Sedgwick's flank completely uncovered, a fact unknown to the corps commander because he was with the lead division. This all occurred because Sumner and French interpreted Greene's presence in the opposite manner:

1. If French had seen Green as a small, disorganized body he would have passed over him and remained connected with Sedgwick's left.

2. If Sumner had seen Greene as a division with offensive potential he would have consulted with him probably before moving Sedgwick forward. This might have led to a coordinated movement of three divisions (Sedgwick, Greene, and French). At worst, it might have caused Sumner to wait long enough to ascertain French's position and insure that the two divisions would go in together.

Next post, "Conduct of Attack"

=========

Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. Operations of Sedgwick's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1962. This typescript report is at the Antietam National Battlefield Library and Archives.

Annotations below within quotation marks are from the Stinson report.

[1] "Francis Winthrop Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1882)."

[2] Here Stinson cites: "Sunken Road Report, 10. The changed position of the battle lines is also discussed in some detail by General Cox in B&L, II, 645 and may be seen by comparing Cope Maps #7 and 8." Stinson identifies these sources in his bibliography as: Sunken Road Report is Dwight E. Stinson, The Attack on the Sunken Road: Operations of Richardson's and French's Divisions. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961; B&L is R.U. Johnson and C.C. Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1884-1888); and Cope Maps are Antietam Battlefield Board, Maps of the Battlefield of Antietam. 14 sheets. Surveyed by Lieut. Col. E.B. Cope. Washington: United States War Department, 1904 and Revised 1908.

[3] O.R.., 487 (Knipe). Stinson notes in his bibliography that "All references [to the Official Records] are from Volume XIX, Part I unless otherwise cited. "[References] will be cited O.R. followed by the page number and the name of the person who submitted the report, as follows: O.R., 275 [Sumner]."

[4] "Cope Map #7. The regiments were the 27th Indiana, 2nd Massachusetts, and 3rd Wisconsin all of Gordon/Williams/XII. The three new Pennsylvania regiments of Crawford's Brigade were also on or near the line as was the 13th New Jersey but these units were operating almost on their won."

[5] "O.R., 499 (Colgrove)."

[6] Greene Report, 9. Stinson's Greene Report is to his bibliographic source : "Dwight E. Stinson, Analytical Study of the Operations of Greene's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961."

[7] "Greene Report, 19-21. Carman, 183, claims that Williams rode up to Sumner from the direction of the Mumma House but it is probable that he mean Miller rather than Mumma."

[8] "C.C.W., I, 368 (Sumner)." Stinson's C.C.W. abbreviation is to his bibliographic source which is Thirty-eighth Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865.

[9] "Sunken Road Report, 10."

Ed Bearss

Today I had the pleasure to join a group of other volunteers for a hike with Ed Bearss, the legendary Civil War interpreter and walker extraordinaire. For me, he is a national treasure. If you aren't familiar with Ed, take a look at his bio on Wikipedia.

We started off at 9 a.m. at the Visitor's Center where Ed gave a quick orientation to the landscape and events leading to the start of the battle. As he spoke a fire broke out in the distance reminding folks of the Mumma Farm conflagration the morning of the battle.

We then boarded a yellow school bus NPS had rented for the day.

First stop was the Line Farm where the XII Corps bedded down late on the 16th about a mile and a half northeast of the I Corps bivouac.

Ed with the Line Farm in the distance. Barely visible through the trees beyond the Winnebago is the original farmhouse. It was in an outbuilding on this farmstead that XII Corps commander William Mansfield died having been wounded in the East Woods early in the morning.

Next stop was the Cornfield. We started south from Mansfield Avenue along the cornfield trail.










Along the way, we ran into a SHAF volunteer crew (Save Historic Antietam Foundation) replanting the East Woods.










Ed holds the group's undivided attention. His encyclopedic knowledge of Corps, Division, Brigade, Regiment movements is astounding. But his stories that weave a narrative of drama, bravery, failings, and humor are what makes touring the field with Ed so special.






While surveying the field from near Cornfield Avenue, we were flanked by a brigade of youngsters from a middle school in Colorado.

Every year they make this trip East to walk the battlefield. This is what history should be about--walking history as well as reading it.

Since they had strayed into a plowed field, Jim Rosebrock and I were detailed to tell them to get back on the trail. After some further prodding they eventually got back on track. A very enthusiastic and friendly group!





Passing through the Roulette Farmstead, the group paused to look for frogs--one of the few times we left the 19th Century all day.









Past the Roulette Farmstead and onto the trail leading to the Sunken Road (just to the left of this photo). Ed is going to be 87 soon but he has the stamina of a 17 year old. He did not sit once during the entire 8 hour hike. II Corps Commander Edwin Vose Sumner's troops complained that he ran them like a horse cavalry. Now I really know what they were talking about.




From the Sunken Road, we hiked parts of the Final Attack Trail which is a beautiful rolling trail. In the winter, with snow on the ground, it is a great cross country ski route.

After 8 hours, the hike concluded at Burnside's Bridge.














If you ever get an opportunity to walk a battlefield with Ed Bearss, do it.


Next post, back to the West Woods.