To the West Woods: The Correspondence of Henry Ropes, 20th Massachusetts, Entry 3

This is the third entry in the correspondence of Lieutenant Henry Ropes to his family between September 3 and October 5, 1862. Ropes was a Second Lieutenant in Company K of the 20th Massachusetts, Dana’s Brigade, Sedgwick’s Division, II Corps. 

Camp 20th Regiment
Tennallytown near Washington, D.C.

September 5th 1862.

My dear Father.

Battery Martin Scott in the District
of Columbia overlooking Chain Bridge.
Harper's Weekly, August 24, 1861.

I wrote to you last from Alexandria, day before yesterday, telling you of our heavy marches to and [1] I was unable to march yesterday and came in an ambulance with Col. Hinks⁠ [2] of the 19th Regiment, a very pleasant man. He told me that we marched 30 miles on Sunday, from 2 A.M. till 12 P.M., and that taking the 3 days together we marched 65 miles in 64 consecutive hours. This march quite used up my foot, and I found yesterday that I was quite unable to march, but to-day it is much better and I have no doubt a few day’s rest will quite restore it.
from Fairfax Court House. Yesterday the Brigade (under Col. Lee) marched to this place crossing at Chain Bridge. Our Corps, and Banks’ is here, and I understand Banks is to-day to move up the river to Poolesville.

We are now on very high land and shall probably be very comfortable.[3] I have written to Poolesville ⁠2and ordered my two boxes there to be sent home to you by Adams’ Express. I enclose the keys. They are filled with Camp equipage which, I could not carry with me from Poolesville. Please open the boxes and make any use of the contents. Some of the things I may need and if so will send for them.

[Notation in pencil: “For close see close of letter 26 September /62_” The “close” from September 26th is amended below. Someone has added a notation in pencil to this amendment that “This is probably the close of a letter dated Sept. 5, 1862 “].

From all I hear, McDowell [4] made a bad job of his retreat and our loss was heavy, and a great deal of valuable Stores and many wagons fell into the enemy’s hands. I can see no excuse for this. A good firm rear guard can stop almost any pursuit. We have now twice covered a retreat, and both times with success.

Jackson seems to strike terror everywhere. I hope Sumner [5] will meet him some day and turn the tables. We expect to be here several weeks. I am perfectly well as usual. Herbert [6] is quite strong and well, and stood the hard marching perfectly. I have written to John [7] to get me a number of things, and I have no doubt it will take up much of his time to see to them, be he is very kind in attending to everything, and I think I have now found out exactly what I need.

Best love to Mother and all. I shall write soon and answer all letters when I can get a tent up.

Ever your affectionate Son

Henry.


Sources
The source for Henry Ropes’ correspondence that constitutes this and the following items in this series is the three volume transcription of Ropes outbound correspondence to his father, mother, and his brother, John C. Ropes. Henry Ropes was killed at Gettysburg on July 3 and from that point on, John C. Ropes undertook a life-long pursuit to memorialize his brother’s life and the regiment’s history. The transcription volumes are the centerpiece of John C. Ropes work and his legacy. Each of the three hand-written transcribed volumes are organized chronologically: Volume 1 is Henry Ropes’ correspondence to his father and mother, and Volume 2 and 3 to his brother, John C. Ropes. For more on the Ropes correspondence, see Richard F. Miller’s excellent essay on historical bibliography at pages 495-499 in his superlative study on the 20th Massachusetts in Richard F. Miller, Harvard’s Civil War: A History of the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2005). Any errors in transcribing and annotating the selected correspondence are mine.


Notes

[1] Poolesville, Montgomery County, Maryland.

[2] Colonel Edward Winslow Hinks (Hincks) (1830-1894) commanded the 19th Massachusetts. He would be seriously wounded in the West Woods.

[3] Tennallytown, District of Columbia, at 500 feet elevation, is on one of the highest points of the District.

[4] Gen. Irwin McDowell led the III Corps of the Army of Virginia under John Pope.

[5] Edwin Vose Sumner commanded the II Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

[6] Lt. Herbert Cowpland Mason (1840-1884), Harvard College, 1862, would be severely wounded in the West Woods.

[7] John C. Ropes, his brother.

The 1962 Stinson Study: First Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” The study that emerged was an internal report titled “Operations of Sedgwick’s Division.” In it, Stinson examined “certain aspects of the operations in the hope that their clarification will result in a more correct interpretation of the battle story.” These “aspects” are casualties, density of formation, accusation of rashness, the “ambush” question, and the Confederate order of battle. His sixty-page typescript report challenged the standing narrative of the fight for the West Woods established by Winthrop Palfrey’s The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1881) and Francis A. Walker’s History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886). While cited in some secondary sources, Stinson’s report has never been published and is located in the Antietam National Battlefield Archives. Over the next few months, selected sections of his report will be posted here. I have chosen to begin with Part III—Analysis and not post Parts I and II which Stinson calls Preliminary Data and Operations—both of which are treated in greater detail in the report's subsequent sections.

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"Part III-Analysis

Although this study deals exclusively with the operations of Sedgwick’s Division, any analysis must consider these operations in relation to the commitment of the entire II Corps. This is necessary for two reasons: the II Corps was committed as a unit by the commanding general and the corps commander, General Sumner, was physically present at the head of Sedgwick’s Division and therefore responsible for all tactical decisions concerning that unit.

A. The Battle Plan

In McClellan’s own words, his plan for the Battle of Antietam was to attack the enemy’s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner’s and, if necessary by Franklin’s, and, as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy’s extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and, whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable. [1]

It must be assumed that when Sumner received the order to advance at 7:20 both he and McClellan envisioned that the II Corps would be operating within the framework of the above stated plan. As far as General Headquarters knew, at the time Sumner was dispatched, the attack of the Federal right wing was progressing favorably.

During the hour and fifteen minutes it took the advance of the II Corps to reach the front, significant changes in the situation were taking place. Perhaps most important of all was the fact, which Sumner had no way of knowing, that Burnside’s attack was not developing as per plan, in fact would be so dilatory that the enemy would be able to shift a whole division from the IX Corps front to the northern sector and send the two reserve divisions as well. This point is usually overlooked by Sumner’s critics but the objective historian should bear in mind that Sumner acted within the guidelines set forth in McClellan’s plan and had every reason to believe that his fellow corps commanders would do so also.

To accomplish this mission, Sumner’s column contained two infantry divisions (Sedgwick and French) comprising some 12,000 men. A third division (Richardson) was delayed for a time by General Headquarters but should be considered as a part of the available force. In addition, Sumner knew that the VI Corps was en route to the battlefield and would be available for further support if needed. It was certainly not improvident to believe that an attack force of 12,000 men supported by 5,000 more had a better than average chance of breaking through the already battered Confederate left and driving it toward Sharpsburg. With this in mind, as he approached the zone of combat Sumner ordered French to follow on Sedgwick’s left.

As has been shown, this promising plan was not followed and Sumner attacked with only a third of his force. The reasons for the deviation are discussed in Section B."

Next: Section B--Sumner's Dispersal of Force

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[1] Stinson cites “McClellan, O[fficial] R[ecord], 55.” McClellan in his “Second Preliminary Report” dated October 15, 1862 recounted that “The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left--at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by assailing the enemy's right--and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand.” OR—Series I—Vol. XIX/1.

Alfred Waud and the West Woods

Alfred Waud (1828-1891) is considered one of the greatest Civil War artists. "During his lifetime he was so acclaimed as a reliable and accurate illustrator of wartime that even long after the war he was still sought out by biographers and historians for his realistic portrayals of the landscape of war." (Dictionary of Literary Biography).

Waud worked for Harper's Weekly and witnessed Bull Run and the major battles in the Virginia theatre.

In early September, 1862, "bearing a pass signed by a Confederate captain from Georgia...Waud went behind enemy lines and captured, if only with pencil and brush, members of the First Virginia Cavalry. In a brief description accompanying the published drawing Waud wrote: 'They seemed to be of considerable social standing, that is, most of them--FFV's [First Families of Virginia] so to speak, and not irreverently: for they were not only as a body handsome, athletic men, but generally polite and agreeable in manner...their carbines, they said, were mostly captured from our own cavalry, for whom they expressed utter contempt--a feeling unfortunately shared by our own army.'" (Vincent Virga and Curators of the Library of Congress with Alan Brinkley, Eyes of the Nation: A Visual History of the United States, Bunker Hill Publishing, 2004).

Waud went on to record many remarkable scenes at Antietam and these depictions of the battle have been widely published. One image, however, is not widely circulated. In it Waud records the firefight in the West Woods between unidentified Confederate and Union regiments. In the lower margin of the drawing, he wrote: "The rebels covered by a ledge of rock repulsing the troops on the Right--in the woods beyond the Dunker Ch[urch]. Antietam." On the right margin, he scrawled: "Genl. Sumners Attack."

To the right of the firing line appears to be the kind of limestone ledge commonly found in the West Woods. In the distance is an opposing line. The woods, as most histories recall, are open and filled with widely spaced, mature trees.

The sketch raises at least two questions: (1) can the ledge be located still? and (2) was Waud behind the Confederate unit?

The first question--"Can the ledge be located?" remains to be seen.

What about the second question? From what perspective and location did Waud sketch this action? It appears from his notation and from the broad brimmed hats worn by the soldiers in the foreground that he was drawing from behind a Confederate unit firing at Sedgwick's Division (Sumner) in the smoky distance.

If this is the case (and it may very well not be the case) it is the only depiction showing action from the Confederate side in the series of sketches he made at Antietam.

What can we make of this? Is it at all plausible that he ranged about the field, using the Georgia captain's pass to move between the lines as he had done a couple of weeks earlier? Highly unlikely in the middle of battle. Still, the depiction is compelling and one that such a "reliable and accurate illustrator" as Waud might capture or at least imagine. The answer could come through his correspondence and papers--but he appears not to have left anything behind. If any reader knows otherwise, please post.

At any rate, Waud left us with the only rendering--eyewitness or not--of what the West Woods "beyond the Dunker Ch[urch]" probably looked like sometime between 9 and 10 a.m. on September 17--and to me, that is remarkable.


Photo by Timothy H. O'Sullivan (for Gardner Studios), Gettysburg, July 1863. Library of Congress; Sketch of First Virginia Cavalry by Alfred Waud, Library of Congress; Sketch of Action in the West Woods by Alfred Waud, Library of Congress.

"I was never in such a fix"--Edwin Vose Sumner and the West Woods

One of the central figures in the West Woods is Major General Edwin Vose Sumner, commander of the Union II Corps. There are a number of unsettled questions regarding the West Woods and some of Sumner's activities and decisions are among them.

One such controversy is noted in the Wikipedia entry for Sumner: "Sumner has been condemned by most historians for his 'reckless' attack, his lack of coordination with the other corps commanders, accompanying Sedgwick's division personally and losing control of his other attacking division, failing to perform adequate reconnaissance prior to launching his attack, and selecting an unusual line of battle formation that was so effectively flanked by the Confederate counterattack." Recently, however, historian Marion V. Armstrong has given us a different view of Sumners actions that day. In Unfurl Those Colors: McClellan, Sumner, and the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign Armstrong persuasively argues that Sumner showed leadership, competence, and bravery in leading Sedgwick's advance into the Woods and directing William "Blinky" French and Israel Richardson to take up on his left. More to come on that subject in future postings.

Three days after the battle, on September 20th. Gen. Sumner wrote home to his wife Hannah Wickersham Foster.

Below is my transcription of the letter. The original can be found at the Library of Congress, in the E.V. Sumner Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.
___________________________________
Camp on the Battle field, Sept 20/62.

My own dear Wife

The battle is over and we are safe. The enemy has fled from Maryland and I do not think we shall meet them again for some time, for it will take a little time to make preparations before we [pursue] them. It was a terrific battle. Scores generally under my command were wounded. Mansfield was killed early in the action, he had only had command of his Corps two days, that Corps (Banks) is under my command in addition to my own. I did not like the way in which the troops were put into battle, they went in Corps after Corps instead of being all formed in battle array before we engaged.

On the right Hooker went first, and then my second Corps under Mansfield and then my own corps. The consequence was that we were not strong enough. Sedgwick was wounded and his division broke, and never did I have to make such exertions as I did to rally that division.

I succeeded finally and got them again into line and held my position.

The enemy fought like maniacs to give you an idea of it. Nineteen of their men lay dead about a piece of artillery that one of my batteries knocked to pieces. Two of my staff were wounded. Col. Revere and young Audenried, they have both gone home.

Our dear boy behaved splendidly, he was much more anxious about me than about himself. He was as cool and manly as an old veteran.

Col. Revere left before he knew the fate of his brother the doctor, he was shot through the heart and killed instantly, but it was not known till the next day. I have sent his remains home in charge of an officer, the battle has been unusually fatal to officers, and especially to those of high rank. I think I was never in such a fix as when that division broke. I was obliged to shout in such a way, that I could not speak loud for sometime afterwards. We have been on the field ever since the battle, to today I have got the command a little more comfortably fixed, and we are all enjoying the rest.

I don't know what their plans will be. I think every thing we can raise should be pushed upon them at once and grind them to powder. If there should be a pause in the operations, I will come home, dear, and rest for I do feel that I need your care and love.

Fathers love to all--dear father. E--

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To me this letter is remarkable in a number of ways. First, it is one of the first documented analysis of the tactical failures of the Federal actions on the 17th--and this coming less than 72 hours after the battle--"I did not like the way in which the troops were put into battle, they went in Corps after Corps instead of being all formed in battle array before we engaged." Second, despite some accounts, Sumner was more than willing to pursue Lee immediately--"I think every thing we can raise should be pushed upon them at once and grind them to powder." Third, why would the second in command of the Army of the Potomac not know what the next move would be on the 20th? That he wrote then "if there should be a pause in the operations, I will come home..." seems to indicate no knowledge that the Army was about to "pause" for over a month before following Lee into Virginia.