The 1962 Stinson Study: Second Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” Part III: Analysis was posted earlier, what follows below is Part III: Sumner's Dispersal of Force.

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"Part III-Sumner's Dispersal of Force

Francis Winthrop Palfrey
Detail from Carte de Visite
Massachusetts Historical
Society.

As in most combat conditions, two situations existed in the zone toward which the II Corps was marching. One was the clear, uncluttered, and correct dispositions shown on the battle map and including such pertinent information as the enemy order of battle. The other was the situation as it appeared to the commander in the field, in this case General Sumner, complete with smoke, confusion, topographic obstructions, conflicting reports, and above all the knowledge that it was his responsibility to bring his men into action agains an enemy of unknown strength in an undetermined position.

Critics are prone to pass judgement on the basis of the former situation with little, if any, reference to the latter. It is safe to say that if Sumner had had the same amount of time to interpret it, he too would have made the correct decisions. The analyst must attempt to correlate the true situation with the facts known or available to Sumner before deciding if his attack was "madness"as Palfrey[1] has stated or if it was the most logical move under the circumstances.

Prior to 8:30 the Confederate main line of resistance on the northern sector of the battlefield was roughly West-Woods-East-Woods-Mumman House. Greene's breakthrough in the East Woods and advance to the Mumma Farm cleared the area north of the Dunker Church and east of the Pike, thereby shifting the Confederate line to one running generally north from the Church through the West Woods.[2]

Brig. Gen. George Sears Greene, XII Corps

South of the Church the line remained unchanged except that the Sunken Road position became an angle and the only part of the entire Confederate main line of resistance still fronting north. All of this took place less than half an hour before Sumner reached the East Woods. It had the effect of bringing his line of march across, rather than on, the axis of the earlier Federal attacks. The shift also created a gap between the divisions of the XII Corps (Williams and Greene) which would have a direct adverse bearing upon Sedgwick and the entire II Corps.

The sudden collapse of the Confederate line in the Cornfield area found Williams' Division in poor condition to follow-up. It had relieved the I Corps some time before and had suffered heavily in the sustained combat that preceded Greene's breakthrough.

The greater part of Crawford's Brigade was in the rear trying to regroup its depleted units.[3] Only three regiments of the entire division were even in proper position for pursuit [4] and their ranks were greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the three regiments were advancing into the Cornfield when sumner's advance was announced on the filed. The colonel of the 27th Indiana reported:

'They [the Confederates] broke and fled, in utter confusion, into a piece of woods on the right. We were then ordered to fix bayonets and advance, which was promptly done...We had advanced over the larger portion of [the Cornfield] when we were ordered to halt. I soon discovered that General Sumner's corps had arrived and were fresh...and the work of dislodging the enemy from the woods, designed for your shattered brigade, had been assigned to them.[5]'

Frank H. Schell's eyewitness rendering of Sumner,
Sedgwick and Staff advancing the division to
the West Woods.

Such was the situation Sumner found on his immediate front which goes a long way toward explaining what motivated his seemingly hasty advance. to express it very simply, the enemy main line was in headlong flight and the only pursuit force was a battered combat team of three regiments. It was the perfect moment for 5,000 fresh men to arrive and the most conservative of commanders would probably have done the same thing Sumner did and that is order the division forward.

But the key to the situation was the location and condition of Greene's Division. This small but organized body was, at the time Sedgwick entered the East Woods, regrouping on the Mumma Farm after its successful attack. It was also awaiting ammunition without which it could not continue its offensive operations.[6] Unfortunately Greene was the only general officer on the field who was aware of these facts. The wounding of Mansfield had left Williams in command of the XII Corps but at the time in question he was occupied in pulling the scattered units of his own division out of Sedgwick's line of advance. It is almost certain that he had no accurate information on Greene's whereabouts and condition.[7] To Sumner, Greene's Division appeared to be nothing more than 'some troops lying down on the left.'[8]

French, under orders to form on Sedgwick's inner flank, had an entirely different view of the situation. His line of march brought him in behind Greene and he could readily see that rather than a few scattered men, Greene commanded a fully organized division. Accordingly, he gave way to the left.[9] This was among the most critical decisions in the Battle of Antietam, for it severed Sedgwick from the rest of the corps and brought on two separate actions neither of which could support the other. Sedgwick attacked almost due west but because of the angle formed by the Sunken Road French, and later Richardson, struck almost due south. It left Sedgwick's flank completely uncovered, a fact unknown to the corps commander because he was with the lead division. This all occurred because Sumner and French interpreted Greene's presence in the opposite manner:

1. If French had seen Green as a small, disorganized body he would have passed over him and remained connected with Sedgwick's left.

2. If Sumner had seen Greene as a division with offensive potential he would have consulted with him probably before moving Sedgwick forward. This might have led to a coordinated movement of three divisions (Sedgwick, Greene, and French). At worst, it might have caused Sumner to wait long enough to ascertain French's position and insure that the two divisions would go in together.

Next post, "Conduct of Attack"

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Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. Operations of Sedgwick's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1962. This typescript report is at the Antietam National Battlefield Library and Archives.

Annotations below within quotation marks are from the Stinson report.

[1] "Francis Winthrop Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1882)."

[2] Here Stinson cites: "Sunken Road Report, 10. The changed position of the battle lines is also discussed in some detail by General Cox in B&L, II, 645 and may be seen by comparing Cope Maps #7 and 8." Stinson identifies these sources in his bibliography as: Sunken Road Report is Dwight E. Stinson, The Attack on the Sunken Road: Operations of Richardson's and French's Divisions. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961; B&L is R.U. Johnson and C.C. Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1884-1888); and Cope Maps are Antietam Battlefield Board, Maps of the Battlefield of Antietam. 14 sheets. Surveyed by Lieut. Col. E.B. Cope. Washington: United States War Department, 1904 and Revised 1908.

[3] O.R.., 487 (Knipe). Stinson notes in his bibliography that "All references [to the Official Records] are from Volume XIX, Part I unless otherwise cited. "[References] will be cited O.R. followed by the page number and the name of the person who submitted the report, as follows: O.R., 275 [Sumner]."

[4] "Cope Map #7. The regiments were the 27th Indiana, 2nd Massachusetts, and 3rd Wisconsin all of Gordon/Williams/XII. The three new Pennsylvania regiments of Crawford's Brigade were also on or near the line as was the 13th New Jersey but these units were operating almost on their won."

[5] "O.R., 499 (Colgrove)."

[6] Greene Report, 9. Stinson's Greene Report is to his bibliographic source : "Dwight E. Stinson, Analytical Study of the Operations of Greene's Division. Unpublished, National Park Service Report, 1961."

[7] "Greene Report, 19-21. Carman, 183, claims that Williams rode up to Sumner from the direction of the Mumma House but it is probable that he mean Miller rather than Mumma."

[8] "C.C.W., I, 368 (Sumner)." Stinson's C.C.W. abbreviation is to his bibliographic source which is Thirty-eighth Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865.

[9] "Sunken Road Report, 10."

The 1962 Stinson Study: First Entry

Fifty years ago, National Park Service historian Dwight E. Stinson, Jr. set out to “present a definitive study of the operations of Sedgwick’s Division at the Battle of Antietam.” The study that emerged was an internal report titled “Operations of Sedgwick’s Division.” In it, Stinson examined “certain aspects of the operations in the hope that their clarification will result in a more correct interpretation of the battle story.” These “aspects” are casualties, density of formation, accusation of rashness, the “ambush” question, and the Confederate order of battle. His sixty-page typescript report challenged the standing narrative of the fight for the West Woods established by Winthrop Palfrey’s The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1881) and Francis A. Walker’s History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886). While cited in some secondary sources, Stinson’s report has never been published and is located in the Antietam National Battlefield Archives. Over the next few months, selected sections of his report will be posted here. I have chosen to begin with Part III—Analysis and not post Parts I and II which Stinson calls Preliminary Data and Operations—both of which are treated in greater detail in the report's subsequent sections.

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"Part III-Analysis

Although this study deals exclusively with the operations of Sedgwick’s Division, any analysis must consider these operations in relation to the commitment of the entire II Corps. This is necessary for two reasons: the II Corps was committed as a unit by the commanding general and the corps commander, General Sumner, was physically present at the head of Sedgwick’s Division and therefore responsible for all tactical decisions concerning that unit.

A. The Battle Plan

In McClellan’s own words, his plan for the Battle of Antietam was to attack the enemy’s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner’s and, if necessary by Franklin’s, and, as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy’s extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and, whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable. [1]

It must be assumed that when Sumner received the order to advance at 7:20 both he and McClellan envisioned that the II Corps would be operating within the framework of the above stated plan. As far as General Headquarters knew, at the time Sumner was dispatched, the attack of the Federal right wing was progressing favorably.

During the hour and fifteen minutes it took the advance of the II Corps to reach the front, significant changes in the situation were taking place. Perhaps most important of all was the fact, which Sumner had no way of knowing, that Burnside’s attack was not developing as per plan, in fact would be so dilatory that the enemy would be able to shift a whole division from the IX Corps front to the northern sector and send the two reserve divisions as well. This point is usually overlooked by Sumner’s critics but the objective historian should bear in mind that Sumner acted within the guidelines set forth in McClellan’s plan and had every reason to believe that his fellow corps commanders would do so also.

To accomplish this mission, Sumner’s column contained two infantry divisions (Sedgwick and French) comprising some 12,000 men. A third division (Richardson) was delayed for a time by General Headquarters but should be considered as a part of the available force. In addition, Sumner knew that the VI Corps was en route to the battlefield and would be available for further support if needed. It was certainly not improvident to believe that an attack force of 12,000 men supported by 5,000 more had a better than average chance of breaking through the already battered Confederate left and driving it toward Sharpsburg. With this in mind, as he approached the zone of combat Sumner ordered French to follow on Sedgwick’s left.

As has been shown, this promising plan was not followed and Sumner attacked with only a third of his force. The reasons for the deviation are discussed in Section B."

Next: Section B--Sumner's Dispersal of Force

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[1] Stinson cites “McClellan, O[fficial] R[ecord], 55.” McClellan in his “Second Preliminary Report” dated October 15, 1862 recounted that “The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left--at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by assailing the enemy's right--and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand.” OR—Series I—Vol. XIX/1.

"I had not had a chance even to sleep for the two or three nights and days previous:" Lafayette McLaws' Advance to the West Woods

Following is a letter from Lafayette McLaws to Henry Heth from the Antietam Studies papers at the National Archives. This collection of documents contains veteran's replies to queries from the Antietam Battlefield Board as to their recollections about the events of September 17, 1862. Ezra Carman eventually used these letters to cobble together his sweeping monograph of the Maryland campaign of 1862. [1]

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Savannah, Ga., December 13, 1894

General Heth:^⁠[2]

A communication from War Department, Antietam Battlefield Commission, Washington, D.C., December 3d instant, and signed by yourself received.

I have written and published a full account of the movements of my Division, in the Philadelphia Weekly Press, to which paper, I am indebted for many courtesies, and I also delivered a lecture in Boston, the subject being the Maryland Campaign—this last was published the morning after it was delivered in the Boston Herald. I cannot at present find a copy of either paper, but as a change of residence has confused everything about the house, I hope to find a copy of both papers and will take the liberty of sending the one to you which gives the most complete history (in my opinion). I would be glad if you would read it, for it contains much matter that is not in “History”? and it is only the nar[r]ative of events given in detail that the true history of events can be learned. The officia[l] reports, at least, those of the U.S. graduates in the army are so condensed that only the results can be learned, and not how it was that those results were obtained.

I crossed the river before daylight, coming from Harper’s Ferry and it was so dark, I had to use torches in crossing and for some distance on this side, (Maryland side). I rode past the place where Gen. Lee was[,] of course was ignorant of his whereabouts, and on past Sharpsburg, this before sunrise, and there was not at that time any firing, nor was there any indication of the close proximity of the two contending armies, as I met no one. I rode back to halt my command, so that I could “look around” to find someone who could tell me where to go and in returning met General Longstreet and staff, coming from the rear. In reply to my question, where is General Lee? he turned in his saddle and pointed to a Bosque or mass of trees about 1/4 of a mile to his rear—said “you will find him among those trees”—when I came by he had just gotten out of his ambulance[.”] I galloped on and found General Lee with his coat off and washing his face (in the bunch of trees pointed out)—which was but a few yards from the road and dismounting reported to him the arrival of my command. He said “well general I am glad to see you, and have to thank you for what you have done, but we have I believe a hard days work before us, and you must rest your men. Do not let them come quite this far as the shells of the enemy fall about here, and halt them about 1/4 of a mile back on the road and I will send for you when I want you.”

I told him that not a half hour previous an order had come to me from General Jackson to go to the right.

General Lee replied “never mind that order but do as I told you and consider yourself as specially under my orders.”

I rode back and halted my command, in plain view of General Lee’s Headquarters and set word along my lines for the men to rest themselves, and not to stray as they would be needed before long.

I, myself, got off my horse turned him loose and was asleep in the tall grass in about a minute. I had not had a chance even to sleep for the two or three nights and days previous. The next thing I remember was being wakened by an officer who was a stranger to me.[3] I jumped up and asked what he wanted—He said “General we have been looking for you, the tall grass in which you were sleeping prevented our finding you. Your division has been called for by General Lee to move in hast[e], and as you could not be found it has been put in motion by your adjutant-general,[4] we will ride together and overtake it.” I mounted at once and we galloped to the head of my division. Anderson’s Division had been ordered to report to Longstreet. Of course I was ignorant of the location of either the enemy’s or of our army, but General D.H. Hill’s staff officer[5] pointed out the direction I was to go and I met General Hood riding by himself in the rear and he gave me additional information. I rode on ahead and quickly realized the state of affairs and halted head of column rapidly formed line to the front, but believing that the Confederate troops—where they were I did not know—were being driven rapidly from the woods in my front,[6] at about 150 yards distant. I told General Kershaw whose brigade was on the right, that we must get to the woods in front of us before the enemy got full possession and to do this I could not wait for his brigade to come up in line and he must double quick there and come up as we would forward. I gave the signal, by waving my handkerchief for the movement to commence in[. I]n a few minutes we were engaged. There was no engagement going on to my right, except now and then some desultory firing. There was some Georgia troops lying quiet in the cornfield to the right which had to give away to permit the advance of Kershaw. I believe they belonged (I do not know to what division) but I think to Hill.

But this I know, where I engaged them there were no Confederates between me and the enemy. Many had given away and gone I know not where, just as I was moving forward, General Jackson come up and directed me to send a Brigade to support Early and I directed General Semmes on my left to go with his brigade, he, General S[emmes] came to me after awhile (himself and courier only) and I asked him where was his brigade? He replied ["]you ordered me to support Earl[y.] I went to the left a short distance and marched in line to the top of the hill.[7] The enemy were there and I advanced against them[.] They stood until I opened fire, when they gave way and I pursued, until I found myself and command in close proximity to a force in my front much greater than mine, with other forces of the enemy to my left and right and as no troops were supporting me I had no other way of getting out of the “cul de sac.” I was in haste to give the order to the brigade to run back regardless of formation and form again in rear of these woods and they are now gathering about the haystack “just in rear.”["][8]

I asked where G[e]neral Earley’s [sic] command was, he said “I never saw it.”

I saw no Confederate dead or wounded over the ground I went over, except those of my own division—there was a plenty of those however—and of the opposing army a great many.

Walker could not certainly been before me, and I am sure he did not come after me over the same ground. Our forces were not in touch with each other during the charge, nor before, nor afterward. D.H. Hill’s command was on my right and Jackson’s on my left and of course his left was a considerable distance from me.

After the enemy had been repulsed, and my men had returned and were along crest of the hill toward the enemy, at edge of woods the enemy opened on us with a large number of guns and being at short range—all species of projectile was used against us. We had no combination of artillery to annoy this against this many of artillery, and had to lie down and take it, shelter ourselves behind the trees on the slope and the rocks and boulders which were plentiful on side of the hill.

During this General Jackson sent for me and asked me to go an reconnoiter on the left for him, as it was reputed that the enemy were demonstrating in that direction. Jeb Stuart and myself went to the left and getting on a small hill were using our glasses when a battery of eight guns about 1/4 of a mile distant fired all their pieces at us, at the same time, but they over-shot us and did not wait for a re[p]etition, as General S[emmes] and myself rode along we saw lines of troops on left of Jackson. We made no inquiries, but I expect Walker was there on the left, as he reports having been ordered there, and I heard heaving firing in that direction after my charge was over, about an hour and a half after, [w]hich coincides with Walker’s report as to time? He may have gone in about the church but of that I know nothing. Hood had been driven back and was much scattered, so I was told. I do not know where they reformed. I met Hood as I have stated and never saw him again on that field. His men may have been in the cornfield. I had no opportunity to reconnoiter on that day, for not long after my charge the enemy opened such a terrific cannonade upon me and at short range, throwing shot and shell, grape and cannister over us and among us with the evident intention to break our center, that we had to lie down along the slope of hill, where we were, and seek the shelter of the numerous trees and rocks which were there. General Lee sent to my aid whilst this was going on the brigades of Arm[i]stead and Ransom (A. was wounded whilst lying down). We had no mass of artillery to content against, the numerous and concentrated batteries of the enemy, but a short distance from us, this continued for some hours. Charlton’s battery from Georgia was put into position by Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, being a special order from General Jackson, and against my protest, to reply to artillery of the enemy, but in ten minutes he lost half of his command and half of his horses and I ordered him to leave his guns and withdraw his horses and the infantry would help take care of them. I lost one gun of Read’s battery[9] on my right, which was disabled, the spokes of the wheels having been cut by infantry bullets, so General Kershaw reported.

I return the map with my route map[p]ed out from just beyond General lee’s headquarters. The map, the maps, does not conform to my recollections as to headquarters of General Lee. I do not thin[k] he was so close to Sharpsburg on the morning I write about. The Bosque he was in then was not 100 yards from the road. I never saw him afterward except on the bank of the river on the night we were re-crossing into Virginia, but I believe the route taken by my Division was correctly marked.[10]

I send the number of the Philadelphia Press of which I have spoken. It has a bearing on the battle of Sharpsburg as it goes to elucidate the condition of affairs when the battle commenced and as it progressed, and shows the exhausted condition in which both Anderson’s and the men of my division were in, when they arrived at Sharpsburg. My men had, had nothing to eat for 36 hours, nor did they get anything until the night after our arrival, as my command was in such close proximity to the enemy, that I had their rations cooked on the other side of the river and brought over. I have the certificate of my chief commissary showing this, and also showing how he failed to get any subsistence stores, from the large amount captured at Harper’s Ferry.

Very respectfully, Lafayette McLaws.

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Source

Antietam Studies, RG 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, D.C.). Typescript. In the upper left corner of page one, in long hand, is “Copy.”

Notes

1. Carman's manuscript has been recently published in two volumes. See, Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. II: Antietam, ed. Thomas G. Clemens (El Dorado Hills, California: Savas Beatie, 2012).

2. General Henry Heth was on the Antietam Battlefield Board.

3. McLaws, in his Official Report, states “my division was ordered to the front by an aide-de-camp of General Lee, Major Taylor.” This was Walter H. Taylor. Douglas Southall Freeman, R.E. Lee: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1934), Vol 1, p. 638); Antietam on the Web for Lafayette McLaw's Official Report, http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=36.

4. This was Major T.S. Mcintosh who was later killed in the battle, “shot through the heart while carrying out one of my orders.” Antietam on the Web for Lafayette McLaws' Official Report, http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=36.

5. McLaws reports that Maj. Ratchford of D.H. Hill’s staff pointed out the position that his division was to occupy. This was Major James Wylie Ratchford (1840-1910). Confederate Veterans Magazine (Vol. 19, p. 133); Antietam on the Web for Lafayette McLaws' Official Report, http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=36.

6. Carman writes that McLaws "met the broken commands of Ewell and Hood retiring from the woods, with their tales of terrible fighting and great slaughter."

7. This was Hauser's Ridge. See further, Atlas of the battlefield of Antietam, prepared under the direction of the Antietam Battlefield Board, Lieut. Col. Geo. W. Davis, U.S.A., president, Gen. E.A. Carman, U.S.V., Gen. H Heth, C.S.A. Surveyed by Lieut. Col. E.B. Cope, engineer, H.W. Mattern, assistant engineer, of the Gettysburg National Park. Drawn by Charles H. Ourand, 1899. Position of troops by Gen. E. A. Carman. Published by authority of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1908, 9:00-9:30 Map showing Semmes' advance. Also see, Semmes' Official Report at http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=132. The movement of Semmes' Brigade will be the subject of future posts.

8. I have supplied the beginning and closing quotes with the supposition that McLaws is quoting Semmes in this passage. The opening quote, certainly, is required. The position of the closing quote, however, cannot be determined in the typescript and so should be viewed with some caution until the original manuscript can be consulted (if ever).

9. “Captain Read's battery had been placed in position on the right of the woods, which we had entered, and did most excellent service, but it was exposed to such a severe fire, General Kershaw ordered it back after losing 14: officers and men and 16 horses.” This was Captain J.P.W. Read’s Battery of the Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery. Antietam on the Web for Lafayette McLaws' Official Report, www.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=36 and Order of Battle, http://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?unit_id=2&from=results.

10. The microfilm of the Antietam Studies collection at the National Archives contains map segments marked up by correspondents. The quality of the black and white image, however, makes it nearly impossible to discern anything especially since respondents often used colored pencils to mark their routes and positions. In a future visit to the Archives I will try to photograph (or arrange for a copy) from the original map in their collection. 

Brian Downey's Dead of the Maryland Campaign

Confederate
Monument, Washington
Confederate Cemetery,
Hagerstown, Maryland
(J. Thomas Scharf)

"At Rest" National Cemetery,
Sharpsburg, Maryland
(Library of Congress)

Brian Downey. who maintains the ultimate Antietam website ("Antietam on the Web" and its companion blog "behind AotW"), has just posted (August 25) an important study on "individual soldiers who died on the Maryland Campaign of 1862."

He observes "as far as I know there is no single, comprehensive list anywhere."

Brian's initial list contains over 2,700 names--less than 1/3 of those who died.

Bookmark his site, since he promises to post new editions of "The Dead List" periodically.

Brian's current list can be found here.

New Maryland Campaign Blog Opens

A new blog on the Maryland Campaign has opened. Civil War Ink promises to explore various aspects of the campaign--from personalities on the field to the actions on South Mountain.

Currently the author is profiling twelve former members of the 36th and 37th Congresses that  participated in the Campaign. William Barksdale, who represented Mississippi in the 36th Congress, is the most recent posting.

Examining U.S. Congressmen at Antietam provides an interesting perspective on the complex events surrounding the Maryland Campaign.

You can visit the blog at: http://civilwarink.blogspot.com

Witness Tree Falls

Sometime during the past couple of weeks, one of the West Woods witness trees fell to the severe storms that have blown through the hills of Maryland. This one, an American Elm, is 178 years old. Behind it are three more witness trees, one dead, the other two apparently healthy. There are more in the West Woods, especially in the original stand west of Route 65. Still, losing one is one too many.

I have not posted here for some time--work and travel get in the way. I am, however, going to pick up the contributions in the coming weeks and months.

First up will be a multi-part post on James Dinkins and the 18th Mississippi (Barksdale's Brigade) in the West Woods. Then a series on the work of Dwight Stinson who worked at the field in the 60s and left an interesting study titled "Operations of Sedgwick's Division" in the field's library / archives.

As we draw in on the 150th, everyone working in the Park is noticing the increase in the number of visitors. We see it in the West Woods. This past Sunday, I had the pleasure of chatting with visitors nearly the entire day. Aside from increased numbers, many visitors have a very good working knowledge about the Maryland Campaign--more so than most of those who have come before them.

What will September bring?

"A good and faithful soldier:" Joseph Henry and the West Woods Missing

The May 21, 2009 post titled "West Woods Missing: Some Preliminary Research" listed members of the 72nd Pennsylvania that went missing in the West Woods on September 17. They were:

William H. Butler, sergeant, Company B.
Charles C. Cooper, private, Company E
John Cornwall, private, Company D
Joseph Henry, private, Company F
John J. McCanna, private, Company D
Theodore Pike, private, Company A

Charles C. Cooper and William H. Butler were subjects of subsequent posts. This post provides information on Private Joseph Henry, Company F.

Third Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia

At the time of his enlistment, Joseph, 32, lived with his wife Elizabeth McGregor, 31, at 1722 Burton Street, Philadelphia. Both were Irish. He was a stable man and she a laundress. Thomas Brainerd, DD, pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church married them on September 17, 1851. Ten years later, the family included four children: Sarah Jane, 9, Mary Ann, 7, Elizabeth, 3, and Joseph, 6 months.[1]

On August 10, 1861, Joseph enrolled for three years service and mustered into Company F led by Captain Isaac McBride. The morning of September 17, 1862 found Joseph and his company crossing the Hagerstown Pike near the Dunkard Church and entering the eastern fringe of the West Woods. 

Captain McBride later stated that "although I did not see him fall, it was proven to my satisfaction that he did fall in that battle with one half half of his head carried away[.] [O]ne of his comrades Private John Cunningham same Company same Regiment took the things from his pockets along with a testament with Henry's name on the fly leaf. That the said soldier was in good health at the time he entered the service and was killed as above described having been a good and faithful soldier, to the date of his death."

Three days after the battle "his body was taken from the field and buried by his Comrades."[2]

Elizabeth Henry's "mark."

On November 24, 1862, Elizabeth applied for and received a widow's pension of $8 per month commencing on September 17, 1862. This was later increased to an additional $2 per month per child (under the age of 16) on July 25, 1866. Elizabeth never remarried and lived until November 21, 1908.

Private Joseph Henry is not listed in the National Cemetery roll. If recovered, he is likely one of the over 1,700 unknowns there. 

Sources

Unless otherwise stated, all sources come from Widow's Certificate File Number WC 3807. Case Files of Approved Pension Applications of Widows and Other Dependents of Civil War Veterans, Ca. 1861-ca. 1910. NARA, RG 15. 

[1] The 1860 U.S. Census for Philadelphia, shows Joseph, 31, and Elizabeth, 30, living in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward. Their children included Rufus, 10, Sarah, 7, Martha 4, and Joseph 1 month. There is no explanation for the discrepancy between children listed in the Census and children recorded in the Widow's Certificate File documents.

[2] Nevertheless, the company muster roll for the months of September and October reported him "missing since the Battle of Antietam."